Arbitrary reference in mathematical reasoning

DOI10.1023/A:1010613027576MaRDI QIDQ5950502zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Enrico Martino

Publication date 5 September 2002

Published in Topoi (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1010613027576

zbMATH Keywords

arbitrary reference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Review text

The author deals with the status of statements like ``let \(X\) be an arbitrary object of the universe of discourse in non-intuitionist mathematics. For intuitionists the existence of an object depends on the possibility to construct it mentally and therefore individual objects in the universe of discourse can be individually referred to. The author claims that also within the classical (realist) conception of mathematics the ideal possibility of referring individually to any object of the universe of discourse is essential. According to Martino this possibility is embodied in the logical concept of an object in classical mathematics. He argues that arbitrary reference is more primitive than reference by description and that it is based on an imaginary choice act. Finally he discusses Russell's ramified type theory in order to make his point more convincing.

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(15)

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• ON THE ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT OF MEREOLOGY
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• On the consistency of a plural theory of Frege's \textit{Grundgesetze}
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• To be is to be the object of a possible act of choice
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