Attacking DSA under a repeated bits assumption
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(10)- On the security of the digital signature algorithm
- Lattice attacks against elliptic-curve signatures with blinded scalar multiplication
- DSA signing key recovery with noisy side channels and variable error rates
- The insecurity of the digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces
- Recovering secrets from prefix-dependent leakage
- Attacking (EC)DSA given only an implicit hint
- The insecurity of Nyberg-Rueppel and other DSA-like signature schemes with partially known nonces
- Bandwidth-optimal kleptographic attacks
- The insecurity of Esign in practical implementations
- Attacking (EC)DSA scheme with ephemeral keys sharing specific bits
This page was built for publication: Attacking DSA under a repeated bits assumption
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5311459)