Bayesian persuasion with complementary information

DOI10.1111/BOER.12479MaRDI QIDQ6985051zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shuo Xu

Publication date 13 May 2025

Published in Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/BOER.12479

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasioncomplementaritymultiple sendersvalue of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Convex Analysis
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns

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