Being wrong: logics for false belief

DOI10.1215/00294527-1435438MaRDI QIDQ645741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher Steinsvold

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-1435438

zbMATH Keywords

modal logicfalse belieflogics of being wrong

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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Cited in

(11)

• Logics of true belief
• Unknown truths and false beliefs: completeness and expressivity results for the neighborhood semantics
• Second-order false-belief tasks: analysis and formalization
• Reflexive-insensitive modal logics
• Logics of Ignorance and Being Wrong
• A non-standard Kripke semantics for the minimal deontic logic
• Incorrect responses in first-order false-belief tests: a hybrid-logical formalization
• Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief
• On some mistaken beliefs about core logic and some mistaken core beliefs about logic
• Knowledge-wh and False Belief Sensitivity: A Logical Study (An Extended Abstract)
• Strong noncontingency: on the modal logics of an operator expressively weaker than necessity

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