Knowledge-wh and False Belief Sensitivity: A Logical Study (An Extended Abstract)

DOI10.4204/EPTCS.379.40MaRDI QIDQ6118741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 28 February 2024

Published in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05073

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Abstract: In epistemic logic, a way to deal with knowledge-wh is to interpret them as a kind of mention-some knowledge (MS-knowledge). But philosophers and linguists have challenged both the sufficiency and necessity of such an account: some argue that knowledge-wh has, in addition to MS-knowledge, also a sensitivity to false belief (FS); others argue that knowledge-wh might only imply mention-some true belief (MS-true belief). In this paper, we offer a logical study for all these different accounts. We apply the technique of bundled operators, and introduce four different bundled operators: $[mathsf{tB}^{m}athttMS{]}^{x}phi:=existsx(mathsf[B]phiwedgephi)$, $[mathsf{tB}^{m}athtt{MS}_{m}athttFS{]}^{x}phi:=existsx(mathsf[B]phiwedgephi)wedgeforallx(mathsf[B]phiophi)$, $[mathsf{K}^{m}athttMS{]}^{x}phi:=existsxmathsf[K]phi$ and $[mathsf{K}^{m}athtt{MS}_{m}athttFS{]}^{x}phi:=existsxmathsf[K]phiwedgeforallx(mathsf[B]phiophi)$, which characterize the notions of MS-true belief, MS-true belief with FS, MS-knowledge and MS-knowledge with FS respectively. We axiomatize the four logics which take the above operators (as well as $mathsf[K]$) as primitive modalities on the class of $S4.2$-constant-domain models, and compare the patterns of reasoning in the obtained logics, in order to show how the four accounts of knowledge-wh differ from each other, as well as what they have in common.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• Craig interpolation property in -bundled fragment of first-order modal logic
• Boxing some: axiomatizations of the -bundled fragment of first-order modal logic

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