Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice

DOI10.2307/1882599MaRDI QIDQ4182193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert A. Pollak

Publication date 1979

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1882599

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's Impossibility TheoremNeutralitySocial ChoiceSocial Welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited in

(11)

• Two simple single-profile impossibilities
• On Pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity
• On the existence of an Arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function
• Welfare, preference and freedom
• Paul A. Samuelson
• Vulnerability to individual and aggregate poverty
• The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated
• An interview with Paul Samuelson: Welfare economics, ``old and ``new, and social choice theory
• Beyond pareto optimality: The necessity of interpersonal cardinal utilities in distributional judgements and social choice
• A single relation theory of welfarist social evaluation
• Concave generalized utilitarianism and well-being comparability

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