Two simple single-profile impossibilities

DOI10.1007/BF00435659MaRDI QIDQ1080340zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. L. Wriglesworth

Publication date 1986

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00435659

zbMATH Keywords

non-utility informationsingle profile impossibility results

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This paper presents two simple single profile impossibility results. The first shows how most single profile results can look very simple when the imposed conditions are stripped of their unessential elements. The second translates A. K. Sen's Impossibility of a Paretian liberal [J. Polit. Econ. 78, 152-157 (1970)] into the single profile context. It shows that by replacing neutrality with a requirement based on non-utility information, we obtain equally significant implications.

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Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson- Samuelson Welfare Function
• Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3504354 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Social Choice Theory: The Single-Profile and Multi-Profile Approaches

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