Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_27MaRDI QIDQ3449549zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis, Zinovi Rabinovich, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23114-3_27

zbMATH Keywords

\(k\)-approval rulesNash equilibriavoting mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting

Cited in

(6)

• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Observing biases in the state: case studies with Trivium and Trivia-SC

This page was built for publication: Beyond plurality: truth-bias in binary scoring rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3449549)