Bit security analysis of lattice-based KEMs under plaintext-checking attacks

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-53368-6_13MaRDI QIDQ6620048zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ruiqi Mi, Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang

Publication date 16 October 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53368-6_13

zbMATH Keywords

KEMKyberlattice-based cryptographylearning with errorsplaintext-checking attacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
• Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
• Fault-enabled chosen-ciphertext attacks on Kyber
• Key recovery under plaintext checking attack on LAC
• Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates

Cites work

• A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
• Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
• Complete attack on RLWE key exchange with reused keys, without signal leakage
• Improving key mismatch attack on NewHope with fewer queries
• LWE with side information: attacks and concrete security estimation
• On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings
• On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography
• On the concrete hardness of learning with errors
• Secure integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes

Cited in

(1)

• Analysis of key reuse security for Aigis.KEM

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