Complete attack on RLWE key exchange with reused keys, without signal leakage

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_27MaRDI QIDQ1784478zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jintai Ding, Scott Fluhrer, Saraswathy Rv

Publication date 26 September 2018

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_27

zbMATH Keywords

active attackskey exchangekey reusepost quantumRing-Learning with Errors (RLWE)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(20)

• Cryptanalysis of RLWE-based one-pass authenticated key exchange
• Key reuse attack on NewHope key exchange protocol
• On removing rejection conditions in practical lattice-based signatures
• Improved attacks against key reuse in learning with errors key exchange
• One sample ring-LWE with rounding and its application to key exchange
• A key exchange based on the short integer solution problem and the learning with errors problem
• Comparison analysis of Ding's RLWE-based key exchange protocol and NewHope variants
• Small leaks sink a great ship: an evaluation of key reuse resilience of PQC third round finalist NTRU-HRSS
• Recovery attack on Bob's reused randomness in CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER
• A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
• A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack
• Revisiting security estimation for LWE with hints from a geometric perspective
• Attack on LAC Key Exchange in Misuse Situation
• Post-quantum cryptography for healthcare: a number theory based two-factor mutual authentication and key exchange protocol over lattices for TMIS
• Do Not Bound to a Single Position: Near-Optimal Multi-positional Mismatch Attacks Against Kyber and Saber
• Bit security analysis of lattice-based KEMs under plaintext-checking attacks
• Analysis of key reuse security for Aigis.KEM
• Quantum key recovery under plaintext-checking attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems
• An improved practical key mismatch attack against NTRU
• Towards post-quantum security for signal's X3DH handshake

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