Towards post-quantum security for signal's X3DH handshake
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Publication:832361
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-81652-0_16zbMATH Open1485.94065OpenAlexW3087207567MaRDI QIDQ832361FDOQ832361
Authors: J. Brendel, Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, Christian Janson, Douglas Stebila 
Publication date: 25 March 2022
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/441452
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Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- Post-quantum asynchronous deniable key exchange and the signal handshake
- Post-quantum static-static key agreement using multiple protocol instances
- Post-quantum signal key agreement from SIDH
- An efficient and generic construction for signal's handshake (X3DH): post-quantum, state leakage secure, and deniable
- Implementing and measuring \textsf{KEMTLS}
- CSH: A Post-quantum Secret Handshake Scheme from Coding Theory
- Ring signatures for deniable AKEM: Gandalf's fellowship
- An efficient and generic construction for signal's handshake (X3DH): post-quantum, state leakage secure, and deniable
- A more complete analysis of the signal double ratchet algorithm
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