On the Security of TLS-DHE in the Standard Model

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Publication:2914265

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_17zbMath1296.94121OpenAlexW2107506969MaRDI QIDQ2914265

Sven Schäge, Florian Kohlar, Jorg Schwenk, Tibor Jager

Publication date: 25 September 2012

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_17




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