Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE
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Publication:1698403
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- HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
- Hash function combiners in TLS and SSL
- Instantiability of RSA-OAEP under chosen-plaintext attack
- Key agreement protocols and their security analysis
- Lucky microseconds: a timing attack on Amazon's s2n implementation of TLS
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- On the security of TLS-DHE in the standard model
- On the security of public key protocols
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- On the security of the pre-shared key ciphersuites of TLS
- Practical invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH
- Protocols for authentification and key establishment
- Proving the TLS handshake secure (as it is)
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- Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
- Tag size does matter: attacks and proofs for the TLS record protocol
- The Security of DSA and ECDSA
- The Security of Triple Encryption and a Framework for Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs
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Cited in
(11)- Secure channels and termination: the last word on TLS
- On the security of the pre-shared key ciphersuites of TLS
- Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security
- Modelling ciphersuite and version negotiation in the TLS protocol
- Password-authenticated TLS via OPAQUE and post-handshake authentication
- On the security of the TLS protocol: a systematic analysis
- Signed (group) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security
- On the security of TLS-DHE in the standard model
- Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard
- Secure communication channel establishment: TLS 1.3 (over TCP Fast Open) versus QUIC
- Flexible authenticated and confidential channel establishment (fACCE): analyzing the noise protocol framework
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