Proving the TLS Handshake Secure (As It Is)

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_14zbMath1334.94060OpenAlexW75729132MaRDI QIDQ2874540

Pierre-Yves Strub, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Santiago Zanella Béguelin, Markulf Kohlweiss, Alfredo Pironti, Cédric Fournet

Publication date: 7 August 2014

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2014 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_14

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (13)

Practical isogeny-based key-exchange with optimal tightness ⋮ Short variable length domain extenders with beyond birthday bound security ⋮ Modelling Ciphersuite and Version Negotiation in the TLS Protocol ⋮ On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode ⋮ Key-schedule security for the TLS 1.3 standard ⋮ Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE ⋮ State separation for code-based game-playing proofs ⋮ A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol ⋮ A Modular Security Analysis of EAP and IEEE 802.11 ⋮ Session resumption protocols and efficient forward security for TLS 1.3 0-RTT ⋮ Secure communication channel establishment: TLS 1.3 (over TCP Fast Open) versus QUIC ⋮ On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments ⋮ 0-RTT Key Exchange with Full Forward Secrecy

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