On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode
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Publication:2170074
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Cites work
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Cited in
(14)- A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol
- On the memory fault resilience of TLS 1.3
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- Post-quantum secure ZRTP
- Post-quantum TLS 1.3 handshake from CPA-secure KEMs with tighter reductions
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