Authenticated key exchange and signatures with tight security in the standard model
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Publication:2139653
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-84259-8_23zbMATH Open1489.94123OpenAlexW3185386066WikidataQ126176071 ScholiaQ126176071MaRDI QIDQ2139653FDOQ2139653
Authors: Shuai Han, Tibor Jager, Eike Kiltz, Shengli Liu, Doreen Riepel, Sven Schäge, Jia-xin Pan 
Publication date: 18 May 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84259-8_23
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- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange, revisited
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange
- Practical and tightly-secure digital signatures and authenticated key exchange
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- On the adaptive security of MACs and PRFs
- Tighter proofs for the SIGMA and TLS 1.3 key exchange protocols
- Unbounded HIBE with tight security
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Cited In (26)
- Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security
- On optimal tightness for key exchange with full forward secrecy via key confirmation
- Practical and tightly-secure digital signatures and authenticated key exchange
- Fuzzy authenticated key exchange with tight security
- Key encapsulation mechanism with tight enhanced security in the multi-user setting: impossibility result and optimal tightness
- Tighter security for generic authenticated key exchange in the QROM
- A New Security Model for Authenticated Key Agreement
- Fine-grained verifier NIZK and its applications
- More efficient digital signatures with tight multi-user security
- Almost tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions from LWE in the standard model
- Lattice-based authenticated key exchange with tight security
- Lattice-based signatures with tight adaptive corruptions and more
- On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode
- Authenticated Key Exchange and Key Encapsulation in the Standard Model
- Optimal tightness for chain-based unique signatures
- Chopsticks: fork-free two-round multi-signatures from non-interactive assumptions
- Toothpicks: more efficient fork-free two-round multi-signatures
- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange, revisited
- Almost tight multi-user security under adaptive corruptions \& leakages in the standard model
- Tightly secure two-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the CK model
- Signed (group) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with tight security
- Two-pass authenticated key exchange with explicit authentication and tight security
- Security model for authenticated key exchange, reconsidered
- Tightly Secure Signatures and Public-Key Encryption
- Two-message authenticated key exchange from public-key encryption
- Tightly-secure authenticated key exchange
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