Small leaks sink a great ship: an evaluation of key reuse resilience of PQC third round finalist NTRU-HRSS

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-88052-1_17zbMath1501.94061OpenAlexW3144672608MaRDI QIDQ2673059

Ruoyu Ding, Chi Cheng, Xiaohan Zhang

Publication date: 8 June 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88052-1_17

zbMATH Keywords

NTRUpost-quantum cryptographykey mismatch attacklattice based cryptographypublic key reuse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

Related Items

Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates, A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack

Uses Software

• NTRU

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Improving key mismatch attack on NewHope with fewer queries
• Assessment of the key-reuse resilience of NewHope
• Misuse attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems
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• On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings
• Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
• High-Speed Key Encapsulation from NTRU