Small leaks sink a great ship: an evaluation of key reuse resilience of PQC third round finalist NTRU-HRSS
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Publication:2673059
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Cites work
- Assessment of the key-reuse resilience of NewHope
- Complete attack on RLWE key exchange with reused keys, without signal leakage
- High-speed key encapsulation from NTRU
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1186948 (Why is no real title available?)
- Improving key mismatch attack on NewHope with fewer queries
- Misuse attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems
- On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings
- Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
- Secure integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes
- Worst-case to average-case reductions for module lattices
Cited in
(6)- Improving key mismatch attack on NewHope with fewer queries
- Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates
- A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack
- Analysis of key reuse security for Aigis.KEM
- Quantum key recovery under plaintext-checking attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems
- An improved practical key mismatch attack against NTRU
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