Misuse attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-17656-3_26MaRDI QIDQ2292893zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ciprian Băetu, Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan, Abdullah Talayhan, Serge Vaudenay, Fatma Betül Durak

Publication date 6 February 2020

Full work available at URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2019/525

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Quantum coding (general) (81P70) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Quantum state tomography, quantum state discrimination (81P18) Quantum channels, fidelity (81P47)

Recommendations

• Key recovery under plaintext checking attack on LAC
• Recovery attack on Bob's reused randomness in CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER
• Assessment of the key-reuse resilience of NewHope
• Security of two NIST candidates in the presence of randomness reuse
• Partial key exposure attacks on BIKE, Rainbow and NTRU

Cited in

(18)

• Key mismatch attack on ThreeBears, Frodo and Round5
• (One) failure is not an option: bootstrapping the search for failures in lattice-based encryption schemes
• A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
• A key-recovery timing attack on post-quantum primitives using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and its application on FrodoKEM
• A power side-channel attack on the Reed-Muller Reed-Solomon version of the HQC cryptosystem
• Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates
• A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack
• Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
• Assessment of the key-reuse resilience of NewHope
• A new decryption failure attack against HQC
• Small leaks sink a great ship: an evaluation of key reuse resilience of PQC third round finalist NTRU-HRSS
• Attack on LAC Key Exchange in Misuse Situation
• Post-quantum cryptography for healthcare: a number theory based two-factor mutual authentication and key exchange protocol over lattices for TMIS
• Do Not Bound to a Single Position: Near-Optimal Multi-positional Mismatch Attacks Against Kyber and Saber
• Key recovery under plaintext checking attack on LAC
• Security of two NIST candidates in the presence of randomness reuse
• Partial key exposure attacks on BIKE, Rainbow and NTRU
• Recovery attack on Bob's reused randomness in CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER

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