A power side-channel attack on the Reed-Muller Reed-Solomon version of the HQC cryptosystem

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_16MaRDI QIDQ6166990zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Thomas Schamberger, Lukas Holzbaur, Julian Renner, Antonia Wachter-Zeh, Georg Sigl

Publication date 7 July 2023

Published in Post-Quantum Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

error correctionside-channel analysispost-quantum cryptographypower analysisHQC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Linear codes (general theory) (94B05) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40) Decoding (94B35)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4112524 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3577144 (Why is no real title available?)
• A practicable timing attack against HQC and its countermeasure
• A timing attack on the HQC encryption scheme
• Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
• Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates
• Information-set decoding with hints
• Misuse attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems

Cited in

(4)

• A new key recovery side-channel attack on HQC with chosen ciphertext
• SCA-LDPC: a code-based framework for key-recovery side-channel attacks on post-quantum encryption schemes
• Efficient error-correcting codes for the HQC post-quantum cryptosystem
• Breaking the Hardness Assumption and IND-CPA Security of HQC Submitted to NIST PQC Project

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