CTRL-PACE: controlled randomness for e-passport password authentication

DOI10.3233/FI-2019-1849MaRDI QIDQ5212028zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Lucjan Hanzlik, Kamil Kluczniak, Mirosław Kutyłowski

Publication date 24 January 2020

Published in Fundamenta Informaticae (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3233/FI-2019-1849

zbMATH Keywords

backdoorcryptographic deviceDiffie-Hellman key exchangePACEprovable securitypseudorandom number generatorsecurity game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Controlled randomness -- a defense against backdoors in cryptographic devices
• Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol
• Supplemental access control (PACE v2): security analysis of PACE integrated mapping
• Public-key generation with verifiable randomness
• Security Analysis of CPace

Cited in

(4)

• Chip authentication for e-Passports: PACE with chip authentication mapping v2
• Controlled randomness -- a defense against backdoors in cryptographic devices
• Supplemental access control (PACE v2): security analysis of PACE integrated mapping
• Stand-by attacks on E-ID password authentication

This page was built for publication: CTRL-PACE: controlled randomness for e-passport password authentication

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5212028)