Security Analysis of CPace
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Recommendations
- Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol
- Security analysis of \textsc{Prince}
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1927581
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1390339
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1941256
- Applied Cryptography and Network Security
- Automated analysis of security protocols
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617924 (Why is no real title available?)
- Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
- Algorithmic Number Theory
- Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
- Decaf: eliminating cofactors through point compression
- Efficient indifferentiable hashing into ordinary elliptic curves
- OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks
- Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2006
- Security Analysis of the PACE Key-Agreement Protocol
- Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions
- Separating symmetric and asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange
- The ``Quantum annoying property of password-authenticated key exchange protocols
- Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2005
- Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange
- Universally composable relaxed password authenticated key exchange
Cited in
(24)- Intermundium-DL: assessing the resilience of current schemes to discrete-log-computation attacks on public parameters
- Key exchange in the post-Snowden era: universally composable subversion-resilient PAKE
- C'est très chic: a compact password-authenticated key exchange from lattice-based KEM
- An efficient strong asymmetric PAKE compiler instantiable from group actions
- The ``Quantum annoying property of password-authenticated key exchange protocols
- CTRL-PACE: controlled randomness for e-passport password authentication
- CHIP and CRISP: protecting all parties against compromise through identity-binding PAKEs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759647 (Why is no real title available?)
- Wireless-channel key exchange
- Supplemental access control (PACE v2): security analysis of PACE integrated mapping
- A universally composable PAKE with zero communication cost. (And why it shouldn't be considered UC-secure)
- An updated security analysis of PFLASH
- How to tolerate typos in strong asymmetric PAKE
- EKE meets tight security in the universally composable framework
- Bare PAKE: universally composable key exchange from just passwords
- Latke: a framework for constructing identity-binding PAKEs
- Under what conditions is encrypted key exchange actually secure?
- Hybrid password authentication key exchange in the UC framework
- PAKE combiners and efficient post-quantum instantiations
- srCPace: universally composable PAKE with subversion-resilience
- Universally composable relaxed asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange
- GeT a CAKE: \underline{Ge}neric \underline{T}ransformations from \underline{K}ey encaspulation mechanisms to password \underline{A}uthenticated \underline{K}ey \underline{E}xchanges
- Making an asymmetric PAKE quantum-annoying by hiding group elements
- Security analysis of \textit{SPAKE2+}
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