Characterizing super stability in the roommate problem under weak preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_13MaRDI QIDQ7299269zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bin Yu

Publication date 17 July 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• On random stable partitions
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable matchings and linear inequalities
• The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
• The stable marriage problem with restricted pairs.
• The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties

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