Childcare and commitment within households

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.04.010MaRDI QIDQ1757585zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paula E. Gobbi

Publication date 15 January 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2013019.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

childcareeducationsemi-cooperative modelstructural estimationtime use

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Raising juveniles
• Family Policy with Non-Cooperative Families
• Efficient investment in children
• Non-cooperative versus cooperative family
• Household choices and child development

Cites work

• Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
• Efficient investment in children
• Family Policy with Non-Cooperative Families
• Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism
• Household choices and child development
• Mostly harmless econometrics. An empiricist's companion.
• Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models
• The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation
• UOBYQA: unconstrained optimization by quadratic approximation

Cited in

(9)

• Non-cooperative versus cooperative family
• Family Policy with Non-Cooperative Families
• Do siblings free-ride in ``being there for parents?
• Life-cycle and intergenerational effects of child care reforms
• Childlessness and economic development: a survey
• SPOUSES, CHILDREN, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
• Raising juveniles
• Efficient investment in children
• An equilibrium model of child maltreatment

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• UOBYQA

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