Detecting algebraic manipulation in leaky storage systems

From MaRDI portal




Abstract: Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes detect adversarial noise that is added to a coded message and stored in a storage that is opaque to the adversary. We study AMD codes when the storage can leak up to holog|G| bits of information about the stored codeword, where G is the group in which the stored codeword lives and ho is a constant. We propose ho-AMD codes that provide protection in this new setting, and define weak and strong ho-AMD codes that provide security for a random and an arbitrary message, respectively. We derive concrete and asymptotic bounds for the efficiency of these codes featuring a rate upper bound of 1- ho for the strong codes. We also define the class of ho^{LV}-AMD codes that provide protection when leakage is in the form of a number of codeword components, and give constructions featuring a strong ho^{LV}-AMD codes that asymptotically achieve the rate 1- ho. We describe applications of ho-AMD codes to, (i) robust ramp secret sharing scheme and, (ii) wiretap II channel when the adversary can eavesdrop a ho fraction of codeword components and tamper with all components of the codeword.











This page was built for publication: Detecting algebraic manipulation in leaky storage systems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2953813)