Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games

DOI10.3982/TE829MaRDI QIDQ4586094zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Sung-Ha Hwang, Markos Katsoulakis, Luc Rey-Bellet

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1007.0723

zbMATH Keywords

deterministic approximationequilibrium selectionlong-range interactionspattern formationspatial evolutionary gamestraveling front solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Abstract: Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This generalizes the known mean-field ordinary differential equations and provide a powerful tool to investigate the spatial effects in populations evolution. The deterministic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the evolution of strategy profiles in a population, such as standing and traveling waves, and pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions.

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Cited in

(14)

• Wright-Fisher diffusions in stochastic spatial evolutionary games with death-birth updating
• Discovering the effect of nonlocal payoff calculation on the stabilty of ESS: spatial patterns of Hawk-Dove game in metapopulations
• A stochastic behavioral model and a `microscopic' foundation of evolutionary game theory
• A multi-step Lagrangian scheme for spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary games
• Persistent homology and the shape of evolutionary games
• The replicator equation in stochastic spatial evolutionary games
• Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games
• Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection
• On the preservation of cooperation in two-strategy games with nonlocal interactions
• SATO–CRUTCHFIELD FORMULATION FOR SOME EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
• Mean-Field Approximations for Stochastic Population Processes with Heterogeneous Interactions
• Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution
• Deterministic approximation of a stochastic imitation dynamics with memory
• Pattern formation in agent-based and PDE models for evolutionary games with payoff-driven motion

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