Dynamic analysis of an electoral campaign

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_9MaRDI QIDQ5251161zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luca Lambertini

Publication date 22 May 2015

Published in Dynamic Games in Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://amsacta.unibo.it/4884/1/415.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

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