Dynamic analysis of evolutionary game considering individual cognition

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2026.131546MaRDI QIDQ7291077zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shuwei Li, Yuhan Hu, Yidong Zhang

Publication date 7 July 2026

Published in Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.PHYSA.2026.131546

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites work

• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Effects of quasi-defection strategy on cooperation evolution in social dilemma
• Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
• How ``punishing evil and promoting good promotes cooperation in social dilemma
• Positive interactions promote public cooperation
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
• Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
• Role of delay-based reward in the spatial cooperation
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
• The influence of quasi-cooperative strategy on social dilemma evolution
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• When selection pays: structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode

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