When selection pays: structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode

DOI10.1063/5.0201582MaRDI QIDQ6552124zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ju Han, Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki

Publication date 8 June 2024

Published in Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
• Games on graphs
• Multi-player games on the cycle
• Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size
• Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection
• The evolution of cooperation
• The replicator equation on graphs

Cited in

(3)

• Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner's dilemma
• Cooperation dynamics of prisoner's dilemma games on an evolutionary weighted network with heterogeneous preferences
• Evolution of trust in \(N\)-player trust games with loss assessment

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