When selection pays: structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode
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Publication:6552124
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
- Games on graphs
- Multi-player games on the cycle
- Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size
- Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection
- The evolution of cooperation
- The replicator equation on graphs
Cited in
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