Dynamic inefficiency: anarchy without stability

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_7MaRDI QIDQ3095259zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.723.3959

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research (90B36) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cited in

(7)

• Inefficiency of democratic decision making in an unstable society
• The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics
• Magnitude of inefficiency
• The Zilcha criterion for dynamic inefficiency
• Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games
• The efficiency of best-response dynamics
• Coordination mechanisms with rank-based utilities

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