Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

DOI10.1142/S021919890300101XMaRDI QIDQ4433462zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume

Publication date 2003

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S021919890300101X

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstochastic stabilityDiscrete choice models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Topologies of social interactions
• Social interaction and conformism in a random utility model
• Discrete choice with social interactions
• Equilibria in systems of social interactions
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Cites work

• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• How noise matters.
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(26)

• Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks
• Awareness, persuasion, and adoption: enriching the Bass model
• Dangerous tangents: an application of -convergence to the control of dynamical systems
• Strategic stiffening/cooling in the Ising game
• Social network influence and market instability
• Social distance, heterogeneity and social interactions
• Endogenous growth and technological progress with innovation driven by social interactions
• Macroeconomic and stock market interactions with endogenous aggregate sentiment dynamics
• Topologies of social interactions
• Equilibria in systems of social interactions
• Strategic interaction in trend-driven dynamics
• Self-excited Ising game
• Social interaction and conformism in a random utility model
• Social Balance and the Bernoulli Equation
• How noise matters.
• Antagonistic and bargaining games in optimal marketing decisions
• Gale-Nikaido-Debreu and Milgrom-Shannon: communal interactions with endogenous community structures
• Dynamic interaction models of economic equilibrium
• Games of social interactions with local and global externalities
• Discrete choice with social interactions
• Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions
• AN URN MODEL FOR CASCADING FAILURES ON A LATTICE
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Polarization and coherence in mean field games driven by private and social utility
• Stability of a spatial model of social interactions
• Global social interactions with sequential binary decisions: the case of marriage, divorce, and stigma

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