Equilibrium implications of delegated asset management under benchmarking

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFQ036MaRDI QIDQ2839188zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Markus Leippold, Philippe Rohner

Publication date 4 July 2013

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ba7320b6ddab7cf70037bd3f4cb68ff99fc4194f

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Portfolio theory (91G10)

Recommendations

• Delegated portfolio management, optimal fee contracts, and asset prices
• Impact of two types of asymmetry on asset prices in delegated portfolio management
• Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices
• Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints
• Optimal benchmarking for active portfolio managers

Cited in

(8)

• Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices
• Delegated portfolio management, optimal fee contracts, and asset prices
• Impact of two types of asymmetry on asset prices in delegated portfolio management
• Institutional Investors and Private Equity*
• Delegated Learning and Contract Commonality in Asset Management
• Unbeatable strategies
• Which investors matter for equity valuations and expected returns?
• How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness

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