Equivalence between Semantic Security and Indistinguishability against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks

DOI10.1007/3-540-36288-6_6MaRDI QIDQ4414699zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yodai Watanabe, Junji Shikata, Hideki Imai

Publication date 27 July 2003

Published in Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_6

zbMATH Keywords

ciphertext attacksindistinguishabilitynondividabilitypublic key cryptosystemssemantic security

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(7)

• Proving possession of arbitrary secrets while not giving them away: New protocols and a proof in GNY logic
• Complete characterization of security notions for probabilistic private-key encryption
• Provably secure Rabin-p cryptosystem in hybrid setting
• On the (Non-)Equivalence of UC Security Notions
• A public-key encryption scheme with pseudo-random ciphertexts
• Equivalence Between Non-malleability Against Replayable CCA and Other RCCA-Security Notions
• SoK: public key encryption with openings

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