Evolution of replicators playing a strategic game

DOI10.1007/BF00336977MaRDI QIDQ1062638zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Petr Kůrka

Publication date 1985

Published in Biological Cybernetics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00336977

zbMATH Keywords

replicator evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Review text

A mathematical model of replicator evolution is considered. Replicators are words of a formal language specifying a strategy for a parlour game. They replicate with mutations and are selected according to their pay-off against other replicators.

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Cites work

• Bifurcation and catastrophe theory
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games
• Lotka-Volterra equation and replicator dynamics: A two-dimensional classification
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. I. Symmetric contests

Cited in

(7)

• Game dynamics and evolutionary transitions
• Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information
• Selfish intracellular replicators: a two-level selection minimalist mathematical model
• A mathematical model for evolutionary systems
• Growth or reproduction: emergence of an evolutionary optimal strategy
• A solvable replicator model
• Reflective evolution under strategic uncertainty

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