Exact and approximation algorithms for PMMS under identical constraints
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Cites work
- Almost envy-freeness with general valuations
- APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
- Competitive algorithms for unbounded one-way trading
- Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
- Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
- Multiple birds with one stone: beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination
- No justified complaints: on fair sharing of multiple resources
- The Nash Social Welfare Function
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