Financing green entrepreneurs under limited commitment
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Cites work
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
- A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
- A theory of socially responsible investment
- A Theory of Wage Dynamics
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
- International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
- Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
- Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
- Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium
- Recursive contracts
- Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation
- Waiting for news in the market for lemons
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