First impressions matter: signalling as a source of policy dynamics

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW007MaRDI QIDQ4610829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1074.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

committeesmonetary policysignalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy
• Electing monetary policymakers according to inflation performance
• Designing monetary policy committees
• Monetary policy by committee: consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?
• On credible monetary policy and private government information

Cited in

(4)

• Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the riksbank's monetary policy committee
• First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
• Monetary policy by committee: consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?
• A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research

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