Fixed points of contractible valued correspondences
The author proves the following approximate selection theorem: Let K be a (finite) simplicial complex, Y a compact ENR, and C a subcomplex of K. let F be an upper semicontinuous map that assigns to each \(x\in K\) a contractible subset of Y. Let U be a neighbourhood of the graph, \(\Gamma(F)\), of F. Then there is a neighbourhood V of the graph of \(F| C\) contained in \(U\cap (C\times Y)\) such that every continuous map \(C\to Y\) with graph contained in V can be continuously extended over K with graph contained in U. This result is used to discuss essential sets of fixed points of contractible-valued maps. Finally, the author defines a fixed point index for contractible-valued maps of simplicial complexes (without relating the index to the Lefschetz number although the connection is fairly obvious). \{Reviewer's remark: The author seems to be unaware of the fact that this index has already been defined in a much more general situation by \textit{H. W. Siegberg} and \textit{G. Skordev} [Pac. J. Math. 102, 455-486 (1982; Zbl 0458.55001)]. Moreover, the problem of extending the index to the ENR-case has also been solved long ago for the more general case of ANR- spaces by \textit{G. Skordev} [Fundam. Math. 121, 41-58 (1984; Zbl 0561.55001)].\}
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