Formal verification: an imperative step in the design of security protocols

DOI10.1016/S1389-1286(03)00292-5MaRDI QIDQ1888495zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tom Coffey, Reiner Dojen, Tomas Flanagan

Publication date 23 November 2004

Published in Computer Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s1389-1286(03)00292-5

zbMATH Keywords

BCY protocol attackCryptographyFormal verificationModal logicsSecurity protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network protocols (68M12) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Operational semantics and verification of security protocols.
• Comparative analysis of formal model checking tools for security protocol verification
• Formal verification of a type flaw attack on a security protocol using Object-Z
• Formal Methods for Assuring Security of Protocols
• Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report

Cited in

(4)

• Comparative analysis of formal model checking tools for security protocol verification
• Formal Methods for Assuring Security of Protocols
• Formal verification of a type flaw attack on a security protocol using Object-Z
• Operational semantics and verification of security protocols.

This page was built for publication: Formal verification: an imperative step in the design of security protocols

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1888495)