Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report
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Cited in
(32)- Security protocols. 9th international workshop, Cambridge, UK, April 25--27, 2001. Revised papers
- Formal verification: an imperative step in the design of security protocols
- Using probabilistic automata for security protocols verification
- Formal analysis and offline monitoring of electronic exams
- Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols
- On the relationships between models in protocol verification
- Computer-assisted verification of a protocol for certified email
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1583798 (Why is no real title available?)
- Security protocols and their properties
- Information based reasoning about security protocols
- Synthesising efficient and effective security protocols
- Toward reasoning about security protocols: a semantic approach
- Security protocol verification: symbolic and computational models
- From model-checking to automated testing of security protocols: bridging the gap
- Emerging issues and trends in formal methods in cryptographic protocol analysis: twelve years later
- Logical formalisation and analysis of the Mifare Classic card in PVS
- How to prove security of communication protocols? A discussion on the soundness of formal models w.r.t. computational ones.
- Comparative analysis of formal model checking tools for security protocol verification
- About models of security protocols
- Let’s Get Physical: Models and Methods for Real-World Security Protocols
- Security Protocols: Principles and Calculi
- Analyzing Security Protocols in Hierarchical Networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2087629 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1903362 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2090853 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2112333 (Why is no real title available?)
- Improvement of a chaotic maps-based three-party password-authenticated key exchange protocol without using server's public key and smart card
- Formalization in PVS of balancing properties necessary for proving security of the Dolev-Yao cascade protocol model
- Automatic verification of security protocols in the symbolic model: the verifier ProVerif
- A Declarative Framework for Security: Secure Concurrent Constraint Programming
- Communicating Sequential Processes. The First 25 Years
- Operational semantics and verification of security protocols.
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