Frege's proof of referentiality

The paper provides a deep analysis of \textit{G. Frege}'s ``Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol.\ 1, \S\S\ 29--31. In these paragraphs Frege attempts to show that every expression of his language has a unique denotation. There is little agreement about the validity of this proof. The author develops a novel interpretation ``which fits the text better than any of its predecessors and shows it to be less confused than often assumed (p.\ 73). He argues that the proof of referentiality involves a contextual account of reference to abstract objects. The author denies ``that Frege had a substitutional understanding of the quantifiers or that the circularities of his contextual account are vicious. He argues that Frege attempts at taming the circularities based on ``a procedure he devised for extending `the sphere of denoting names' step by step (p.\ 74). The proof of referentiality would establish the consistency of the logical theory of the ``Grundgesetze which is, however, as Russell's paradox proves, not given. The author claims that Frege's mistake lies only ``in a faulty \textit{application} of these ideas, because he didn't restrict his proof strategy to \textit{predicative} abstraction principles (ibid.).

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