GAME-THEORETIC RESOURCE MODELING
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Cited in
(18)- On shared use of renewable stocks
- The tragedy of open ecosystems
- Welfare measurement and cost-benefit analysis in Nash and Stackelberg differential fish games
- Exploitation of an unmanaged local common. On the problems of overgrazing, regulation and distribution
- Effort subsidies and entry deterrence in transboundary fisheries.
- COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
- FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAMES: HOW TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS AND REDUCE HARVESTING LEVELS
- Sustainable coalitions in the commons
- NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLOITATION UNDER COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS
- REGULATION OF A PREY-PREDATOR FISHERY BY TAXATION: A DYNAMIC REACTION MODEL
- Growth and measurement uncertainty in an unregulated fishery
- Complex dynamics analysis on fish stock harvested by two players with heterogeneous rationality
- Complex dynamics analysis for a duopoly model of common fishery resource
- Common pool resources with support
- A game-theoretic systematics of conservation and management of spatial ecosystem services
- Expectation-stock dynamics in multi-agent fisheries
- Resource dynamics under partial cooperation in an oligopoly
- Variable effort management of renewable natural resources
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