General lower bounds for chosen-content attacks against authentication codes
A common approach to authentication systems considers an opponent to be successful if he can construct a cryptogram that the receiver accepts as authentic. In the paper a slightly different model of authentication is considered. In the model an opponent is successful if he succeeds in sending the receiver a fraudulent cryptogram that the receiver accepts as authentic and moreover the cryptogram decodes into a clear message favourable to the opponent. This type of attack is called a chosen-content attack. The paper begins with an introduction to the chosen-content attack scenario, relevant notations and definitions. Then, fraud schemes originally introduced by the second author are recapitulated together with a lower bound to the fraud probability for a given fraud scheme. The tool is subsequently used to derive lower bounds for the probability of success for chosen-content impersonation and chosen-content substitution attacks.
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