Inapproximability of Nash equilibrium

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Abstract: We prove that finding an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant epsilon and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions. As corollaries, we also prove similar inapproximability results for Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a two-player incomplete information game with a constant number of actions, for relative epsilon-Well Supported Nash Equilibrium in a two-player game, for market equilibrium in a non-monotone market, for the generalized circuit problem defined by Chen, Deng, and Teng [CDT'09], and for approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes with indivisible goods.




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