Infinite Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Hausdorff Difference Hierarchy

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-28678-5_11MaRDI QIDQ2798026zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stéphane Le Roux

Publication date 1 April 2016

Published in Topics in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.06320, https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01446258/file/385217_1_En_11_Chapter.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Borel hierarchyinfinite multi-player games in extensive formPareto-optimalitypreference characterizationsubgame perfection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Descriptive set theory (03E15) Determinacy principles (03E60) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Abstract: Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous real-valued payoffs, but may fail to exist even in simple games with slightly discontinuous payoffs. This article considers only games whose outcome functions are measurable in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy of the open sets ( extit{i.e.} $Delt{a}_2^0$ when in the Baire space), and it characterizes the families of linear preferences such that every game using these preferences has a subgame perfect equilibrium: the preferences without infinite ascending chains (of course), and such that for all players $a$ and $b$ and outcomes $x,y,z$ we have $eg(z{<}_{a}y{<}_{a}x,wedge,x{<}_{b}z{<}_{b}y)$. Moreover at each node of the game, the equilibrium constructed for the proof is Pareto-optimal among all the outcomes occurring in the subgame. Additional results for non-linear preferences are presented.

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Cited in

(9)

• Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
• Parameterized games of perfect information
• On the termination of dynamics in sequential games
• On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
• Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games
• On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
• Dynamics and coalitions in sequential games
• Infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs
• Concurrent games and semi-random determinacy

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