Instance-optimal information-based voting

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2024.114945MaRDI QIDQ6652466zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Flavio Chierichetti

Publication date 12 December 2024

Published in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TCS.2024.114945

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Recommendations

• Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5030410

Cites work

• Concentration inequalities for sums and martingales
• Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• Probability Inequalities for the Sum of Independent Random Variables
• Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives

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