Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation

DOI10.1006/JUEC.1994.1036MaRDI QIDQ4398216zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amihai Glazer, Kai A. Konrad

Publication date 14 July 1998

Published in Journal of Urban Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101599

zbMATH Keywords

income insurancemajority votingredistributive taxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Voting on redistribution with tax evasion
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Cited in

(10)

• The political economy of endogenous taxation and redistribution
• Uncertainty and the size of government
• Democratic public good provision
• Voting under temptation
• Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
• Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations
• Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes
• Voting on redistribution with tax evasion
• Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer-Richard model under interdependent labor inputs
• A tax and redistribution experiment with subjects that switch from risk aversion to risk preference

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