Strong equilibrium for conflict problems (Q1007057)

The paper's concern is to find criteria for equilibrium in \(n\)-person games so as to enlarge the class of models where equilibrium uniqueness holds. The \(\overline D'\)-equilibrium strengthens conditions imposed in existing definitions and allows to extract a subset of equilibria -- this action may result in a unique solution, though it is not sufficient for this goal. The first part of the paper is devoted to introduction of existing definitions and the new one. Though they are given for two-person games their generalization seems to be obvious. In the second part of the article the new notion of equilibrium is related to the so-far existing ones (in static context) and finally the new definition is applied to differential games. The presented examples make understanding of the ideas easier and prove that \(\overline D'\)-equilibrium need not be unique though sometimes uniqueness under the new criterion is assured.