Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games (Q1016332)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5550693
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| English | Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5550693 |
Statements
Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games (English)
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5 May 2009
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The author provides sufficient conditions for finite-horizon multistage game so that the value function is supermodular and contemporaneous equilibrium is increasing in state variables. These consumptions are the following: the current payoff of each player has the complementarity property in any pair of variables, the law of motion is increasing and supermodular in actions and state variables, the contemporaneous equilibrium is continuous and supermodular (in state variable), and payoffs and transition probability, and equilibrium satisfy convexity property.
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Markov perfect equilibrium
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multistage game
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\(n\)-player finite-horizon game
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0.8243404030799866
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0.7947157621383667
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0.7882694602012634
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0.7789290547370911
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0.7713427543640137
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