Wittgensteinian tableaux, identity, and co-denotation (Q1020577)

The article investigates an alternative way of doing first-order logic which is suggested in Wittgenstein's famous 1922 \textit{Tractatus}. The suggestion is that, in a quantified formula \(\forall x \, \phi\), the bound variable \(x\) should range not over all objects of the domain -- as is customary -- but over all objects of the domain \textit{except those mentioned in \(\phi\)}. For instance, \(\forall x \, \exists y \, Rxy\) says that for all \(x\) there is a \(y\) \textit{other than \(x\)} such that \(x\) bears \(R\) to \(y\). The resulting logic is called \(W\)-logic and was first investigated by Hintikka, who in 1956 showed that -- provided no individual constants or function symbols are present -- first-order logic without identity but with Wittgenstein's alternative semantics has the same expressive power as ordinary first-order logic with identity. The present article presents a tableaux calculus which is proved to be sound and complete for \(W\)-logic. The article then discusses issues of translatability between Wittgensteinian and standard first-order logic in languages with and without individual constants. In particular, a metalinguistic co-denotation predicate is used to bestow the full expressive power of first-order logic with identity on \(W\)-logic in the presence of individual constants. However, the co-denotation predicate has the awkward feature that it is only defined between individual constants, which prevents us from replacing constants to which the predicate is applied by variables.