Merging asymptotic expansions for cooperative gamblers in generalized St. Petersburg games (Q1046826)

Merging asymptotic expansions are established for the distribution functions of suitably centered and normed linear combinations of winnings in a full sequence of generalized St. Petersburg games, where a linear combination is viewed as the share of any one of \(n\) cooperative gamblers, who play with a pooling strategy. The expansions are given in terms of Fourier-Stieltjes transforms and are constructed from suitably chosen members of the classes of subsequential semistable infinitely divisible asymptotic distributions for the total winnings of the \(n\) players and from their pooling strategy, where the classes themselves are determined by the two parameters of game. For all values of the tail parameter, the expansions yield best possible rates of uniform merge. Surprisingly, it turns out that for a subclass of strategies, not containing the averaging uniform strategy, the merging approximations reduce to asymptotic expansions of the usual type, derived from a proper limiting distribution. The Fourier-Stieltjes transforms are shown to be numerically invertible in general and it is also demonstrated that the merging expansions provide excellent approximations even for very small \(n\).